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Abstract: This research discusses the Internet service provider (ISP) bandwidth 
allocation and pricing problems for a duopoly bandwidth market with two competitive 
ISPs. According to the contracts between Internet subscribers and ISPs, Internet 
subscribers can enjoy their services up to their contracted bandwidth limits. However, in 
reality, many subscribers may experience the facts that their on-line requests are denied 
or their connection speeds are far below their contracted speed limits. One of the reasons 
is that ISPs accept too many subscribers as their subscribers. To avoid this problem, ISPs 
can set limits for their subscribers to enhance their service qualities. This paper develops 
constrained nonlinear programming to deal with this problem for two competitive ISPs. 
The condition for reaching the equilibrium between the two competitive firms is derived. 
The market equilibrium price and bandwidth resource allocations are derived as closed 
form solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Two of the most popular technologies that offer speedy access to surf the 
Internet are the DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) broadband and the cable Modem. DSL   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  66 
service provides Internet access over a single dedicated telephone line, while Cable 
broadband service provides Internet access over a cable television line. 
The advantages of DSL incorporate cheaper service than cable Internet, no dial 
up, no busy signals and a unique connection. Several different types of DSL exist. ADSL 
is one of the most popular broadband media among them, for both commercial and 
residential internet users. ADSL is a mod/demod technology providing high-speed web 
service through a traditional telephone line. ADSL can also be used to provide home 
office workers with company Internet services or new style interactive multimedia 
applications, including web games and VOID services. 
Regarding the Cable Modem, it uses the high bandwidth cable system laid by 
the cable TV service provider to enable users to watch TV programs, use telephone 
services and surf the Internet simultaneously. The greatest advantage of Cable Modem is 
a huge bandwidth with its technological specifications, making the data transmission 
speed ascend promptly, and consequently, the dream of transferring more data on a given 
bandwidth is realized. In addition, Cable offers a much wider service area than DSL. 
The bandwidth requirements are distinctive according to the needs of the 
Internet users. Operating in such an environment, DSL and Cable providers usually offer 
a variety of bandwidth commodities to serve their customers, with each Internet 
commodity having a different sales price and a unique bandwidth restriction. 
To offer different Internet commodities to customers, both DSL and Cable 
providers face the problems of allocating a bandwidth resource to distinct Internet 
commodities. According to the subscription contracts, Internet users are allowed to 
access Internet service within the contracted speed. However, in reality, they are usually 
in a situation that their on-line requests are denied, or their connection speeds are far 
below their contracted speed limits. The quality of the Internet services may be 
influenced by the number of on-line users. It is natural to assume that the quality of the 
Internet services will become poorer if too many users access the Internet at the same 
time. To improve their corporation images, both DSL and Cable providers have to 
provide their Internet subscribers with the agreed service qualities. One of the possible 
approaches for overcoming this problem is to control the number of subscribers. To reach 
this goal, both DSL and Cable providers can use the pricing strategies to control the 
number of subscribers. 
It is possible to surf the Internet by either DSL or Cable Modem. For 
competition purposes, DSL and Cable providers may offer similar Internet commodities 
to complete the same custom pool. According to this and the previously mentioned fact, 
both DSL and Cable providers may seriously consider their pricing strategies to complete 
in the Internet market. This paper considers a duopolistic market which consists of a DSL 
provider and a Cable provider. The two Internet service providers offer two similar 
Internet commodities. 
To our knowledge, few works deal with the ISP competition problem with 
service quality guarantees. Other research related to this article includes the works on the 
equilibrium price in duopoly market. Palma and Leruth (1993) dealt with a duopoly 
model for two firms which sell homogeneous goods. They showed the existence of a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium price.  Harrington (1995) investigated the price-setting 
behavior in a duopoly market where the degree of product differentiation is uncertain. 
They showed that in markets with highly substitutable products, price dispersion can be 
enhanced, since price adjustment is used to obtain more information about the context of   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  67 
product differentiation. Choi (1996) dealt with a price competition problem with duopoly 
manufacturers and duopoly common retailers.  This paper proves that product 
differentiation is helpful to manufacturers, while store differentiation is helpful to 
retailers. Peha and Tewari (1998) examined the result of competition between two profit-
seeking telecommunications carriers. In their work, each firm has a limited capacity that 
can be used to offer two different services. They showed conditions for an equilibrium 
where no carrier has any incentive to change its prices and outputs. Elberfeld and 
Wolfstetter (1999) investigated a repeated game with simultaneous entry and pricing. 
They provided a symmetric equilibrium solution. Mason (2000) dealt with an Internet 
pricing problem. This paper showed that conditions for reaching equilibrium for two 
competitive firms exist. Foros and Hansen (2001) dealt with a competition problem 
between two ISPs providing the quality of interconnection. Min et al. (2002) dealt with a 
pricing setting problem for two competitive firms that produce substitutable products. 
They derived equilibrium solutions based on a two-stage game framework. Basar and 
Srikant (2002) investigated a leader-follower game problem for a network with a single 
ISP and a larger number of users. In this problem, the service provider sets the sales price 
and the customers react to the price, as well as to the network congestion. Bapna et al. 
(2005) investigated a pricing setting problem for digital products. This study contains a 
service provider that uses a price setting mechanism to maximize its allocation 
efficiency. Symeonidis (2003) compared Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium in a 
differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. This paper provides a 
condition that quantity competition is more beneficial than price competition for both 
consumers and firms. Dai et al. (2005) developed pricing strategies for a revenue 
management problem with multiple firms providing the same service for a common pool 
of customers. They showed that Nash equilibrium exists in a two-firm pricing game when 
the demands of both firms are deterministic. 
The strategy in duopoly environment has been widely studied in many 
industries. The constraints on most of the studies include the budget constraint, quantity 
constraint, etc. As mentioned previously, ISPs need to take their service quality into 
account. If ISPs are unable or have no plan to expand their equipment over a future time 
interval, endlessly accepting customers as their subscribers, they will run the risk of poor 
Internet access quality. To avoid such a situation, both DSL and Cable providers should 
seriously set their pricing strategies, in order to improve their service qualities. 
This research discusses the bandwidth allocation and pricing problems by taking 
the service qualities into account. The model hypothesizes that there is only a DSL 
service provider and a Cable service provider in the market; the two service providers 
offer two similar Internet service commodities, and both of the rivaling parties confront 
limited total bandwidth and service level. By establishing a mathematical model and 
Lagrange function, reaction functions of the two service providers can be obtained. 
Through the derived reaction functions and some condition, this paper obtains closed 
form formulas for the market equilibrium prices and bandwidth resource allocations for 
the two competitive ISPs. 
 
2. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS, DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION 
This section of the paper will develop a mathematical model for the problem. 
We assume that a DSL Internet service provider and a Cable Internet service provider   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  68 
exist. We use index  1 = m  to denote the DSL service provider and index  2 = m  to denote 
the Cable service provider. The total bandwidth units available for provider m are  m B . 
Both providers are assumed to offer two similar Internet commodities. The sales price for 
commodity i  of provider m is a decision variable and is denoted by  i m p , . Customers are 
able to purchase their commodities either from the DSL service provider or the Cable 
service provider. The demand curves for the two service providers are given as functions 
of prices. For convenience, we let  2 = ′ m  if  1 = ′ m , 1 = ′ m  if  2 = m , 2 = ′ i  if  1 = i  and 
1 = ′ i  if  2 = i . Demand for commodityi ,  { } 2 , 1 ∈ i  of provider m is assumed to follow the 
function of 
) ( ) ( , , , , , , , , i m i m m i m i m i i m i m i m i m p p p p h p v a q − − + − = ′ ′ β  (1) 
where the symbol  i h   represents the substitution coefficient of similar commodities 
offered by different service providers and is assumed to be  1 ≤ i h , and  m β  represents the 
substitution coefficient of different commodities offered by service provider m and is 
assumed to be  1 ≤ m β . The demand function illustrates that the demands for bandwidth 
commodities are dependent not only on the sales price of rivaling service provider for the 
similar commodities, but on the sales price of its different commodity as well. 
For provider m, we denote  i m b ,  as the number of bandwidth units allocated for 
commodity i. Service provider m is confronted with the limitation of total bandwidth 
units. That is, the total bandwidth units that the service provider m allocates to all types 
of bandwidth commodities shall never exceed the total bandwidth unit  m B . 
The fraction of the number of online users to the total number of subscribers 
(on-line users plus off-line users) of commodity i of service provider m at any time is 
assumed to be an identical random variable rm,i. The random variable rm,i takes value 
between 0 and 1 and is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean μm,i and 
deviation  i m, σ . 
The amount of bandwidth resource required by an online subscriber of 
commodity i of service provider $m$ is assumed to be um,i bandwidth units. Suppose the 
total number of subscribers for commodity i of service provider m is  i m q , ,  and the 
fraction of the number of on-line subscribers to the total number of subscribers is  i m r , . 
Consequently, the bandwidth units required for commodity i is  i m r ,  qm,i um,i is the number 
of subscribers of commodity i of a service provider m that makes online requests. In 
order to keep the ISP’s service quality, we assume that ISP m will let the probability, i.e., 
the ratio of the number of bandwidth units allocated for commodity i exceeds the number 
of bandwidth resource needed by subscribers of commodity i, be no less than the 
prescribed service level  1 0 , ≤ < i m α . 
This paper aims to set the equilibrium commodity price pm,i and determine the 
bandwidth allocation decisions bm,i. We have illustrated the model descriptions and 
assumptions. We will now formulate the model. Firstly, we summarize our notation and 
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Notation: 
i m a , = the intercept of demand function for commodity i of service provider m, 
i h  = the coefficient of substitution for commodity i between service providers, 
m β = the coefficient of substitution between commodity i and commodity i' of 
service provider m, 
i m u , = unit bandwidth consumption for commodity i of service provider m, 
i m, α = guaranteed service level of commodity i of service provider m, 
i m r , = the fraction of the number of online users to the total number of subscribers of 
commodity i of provider m at any time, 
i m, μ = mean of the random variable  i m r , , 
i m, σ = deviation of the random variable  i m r , , 
m B = total available bandwidth units for service provider m, 
i m p , = decision variables, representing the sales price of commodity i of service 
provider m, 
i m b , = decision variables, representing the number of bandwidth units allocated for 
commodity i of service provider m. 
 
Revenue function 
Let m R be the revenue for firm m. Suppose service provider m sets the sales 
price of commodity i at i m p , . The total revenue for service provider m can then be 
expressed as follows. 
∑ =
=
2
1
, ,
i
i m i m m q p R  (2) 
Resource and service constraints 
Since the sum of the bandwidth units allocated for all commodities cannot 
exceed the available bandwidth unit m B , we have the following bandwidth resource 
constraint for service provider m. 
. 0
2
1
, ≤ ∑ −
= i
m i m B b  (3) 
Suppose  i m b ,  is allocated for commodity i. Since the number of subscribers of 
commodity i of service provider m is expected to be  mi q , the bandwidth units required 
by these subscriber is the number of  i m mi mi r u q , . Because the probability that the number 
of bandwidth units allocated for commodity i exceeds the number of bandwidth resource 
needed by subscribers of commodity i is required to be no less than a prescribed service 
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. , , ) ( ob Pr , , , i m r u q b i m i m mi mi i m ∀ ≥ ≥ α  (4) 
or, equivalently 
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, ,
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As  i m r , is assumed to be a normal random variable with mean  i m, μ  and 
deviation  i m, σ , the above inequality can be rewritten as follows 
i m Z
u q
b
i m i m i m
i m i m
i m , / , , ,
, ,
, ∀ ≥ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− σ μ  (6) 
where  i m Z ,  is called the z-statistic (Stone, 1996). The value of  i m Z ,  can be evaluated 
using the Excel function NORMSINV as  ) ( , , i m i m NORMSINV Z α = . The purpose of this 
paper is to establish the conditions for attaining the market equilibrium price  i m p ,  and 
bandwidth allocation  i m b , . Let  m p  and  m b  be 2-dimensional vectors with elements  i m p ,  
and  i m b ,  respectively, at i-th entry. Accordingly, the formulation of service provider m 
can be established as follows. 
∑ =
=
2
1
, ,
,
max
i
i m i m m
b p
q p R
m m
 (7) 
subject to inequality (3) and 
i Z u q b i m i m i m i m i m i m ∀ + ≥ ), ( , , , , , , μ σ  (8) 
where inequality (8) is a rewritten form of inequality (6). 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of shortening our formulation, we will denote the following 
functions. 
, , , m i i m i m h u c β + + =  (9) 
). ( , , , , , i m i m i m i m i m Z u g μ σ + =  (10) 
Afterwards, we can rewrite revenue function  m R  as follows. 
. ) ( 2 ,
2
1
, ' , 2 , 1 ,
2
1
2
, , i m
i
i m i i m m m m
i
i m i m m p p h p p p c R ∑ + + + ∑ − =
= =
α β  (11) 
In addition, using (1) and (10), we can rewrite inequality (8) as follows.   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  71 
. 0 ) ( ) (
2
1
, , , ' , , , , , ≤ ∑ − + + + + −
= i
i m mi i m m i m i i m i m i m m i m i m b p g p h g p c g β α β  (12) 
Theorem 3.1  m R  is concave function of  m p  
Proof: Let  m H  be the Hessian matrix of  m R . Consequently, the result follows if 
m H  is negative definite. First, we have  2
2
2
− =
∂
∂
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m
p
R
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Thus,  m H  is negative definite and we have completed the proof.   
The Lagrangian function for service provider m can be formulated as follows. 
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where  i m, λ , and  m η  Lagrangian multipliers, and  m y  and  i m x ,  are slack variables. Now, 
we are ready to develop the reaction function for service provider m. Taking the partial 
derivatives of  m L  with  respect  to  i m p , , i m b , , i m, λ , m η , m y  and  i m x , , we obtain the 
following KKT conditions for service provider m. 
, 0
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Let
*
,i m p ,
*
,i m b , i m, λ , m η , m y and i m x , be a solution point to the above equation 
system of Eq. (15) to Eq. (20). In Theorem 3.1, we have shown that  m R  is concave 
function of  m p . Thus, if the values of
*
,i m p ,
*
,i m b , i m, λ , m η , m y and i m x , are no less than 
zero, the functions of
*
,i m p and
*
,i m b  are service provider m's reaction functions. For the 
purpose of simplifying our expression, we will denote the following function. 
∑ + − =
=
2
1
' ). ( 5 . 0
i
i m i mi mi m m p h g B A α  (21) 
Theorem 3.2 Suppose  . 0 > m A   Then, the service provider m's reaction functions are 
given by
*
,i m p and 
*
,i m b  where 
) ( 2
2
2 1
' ' ' ' ' ' ' *
,
m m m
mi m mi mi i m mi i i m i m
i m
c c
c p c h p h
p
β
α β α β
−
+ + +
= , (22) 
) ( 5 . 0 '
*
i m i mi mi mi p h g b + = α . (23) 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
Although the condition of  0 > m A  is restrictive to the problem, it exists in many 
business practices since an Internet service provider's available bandwidth units are 
usually very large. 
Theorem 3.3 Suppose 0 > m A . Then, the equilibrium sales price mi p ˆ and the bandwidth 
allocation decision  mi b ˆ  are given by the following} 
E
h h
E
h c h h
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h c c h c h c h
E
c c c
p
i m i i i m mi mi i m i i
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() i m i mi mi mi p h g b ' ˆ 5 . 0 ˆ < + = α  (25) 
where 
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Proof: According to Theorem 3.2, we see that the solution to the equation systems 
*
1 , 1 1 , 1 p p =  , 
*
2 , 1 2 , 1 p p = , 
*
1 , 2 1 , 2 p p =  and
*
2 , 2 2 , 2 p p =   are equilibrium sales price. By 
solving them, we obtain  1 , 1 1 , 1 ˆ p p =  , 2 , 1 2 , 1 ˆ p p =  , 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ p p = ,  2 , 2 2 , 2 ˆ p p = . Thus, the 
equilibrium sales price is given by mi p ˆ . Replacing 
*
mi p in (22) with mi p ˆ , we see that the 
bandwidth allocation decision is given by (25). Therefore, we have completed the proof.  
 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section will provide some examples to illustrate the functioning of the 
model in the proposed framework. Let us assume that the parameters of  i m a , ,  i m v ,  and 
i m u ,  are given in Table 1, and the parameters of  i m, α , i m, μ  and  i m, σ  are given in Table 2 
where  i m Z ,   is determined by using the Excel function NORMSINV as 
i m Z , =NORMSINV( i m, α ). 
Table 1: parameters 
m  1 , m α   2 , m α   1 , m σ   2 , m σ   1 , m μ   2 , m μ   1 , m Z   2 , m Z   m B  
1 120000  80000  100  90  0.50 0.50  4  2 250000 
2 100000  85000 90  100 0.50 0.50  4  2 300000 
Table 2: parameters of i m, α ,  i m, μ ,  i m, σ and  i m Z ,  
m  1 , m α   2 , m α   1 , m σ   2 , m σ   1 , m μ   2 , m μ   1 , m Z   2 , m Z  
1  0.750 0.800 0.100  0.08  0.55  0.65 0.6745  0.8416 
2  0.800    0.825 0.080  0.07  0.65  0.70 0.8416  0.9346 
 
Substituting the above values into (21), we obtain  1 A =43,931.9>0 
and 2 A =90,874.6>0. Thus, by Theorem 3.3,  mi p ˆ in (24) and  mi b ˆ   in (25) are the 
equilibrium sales price and bandwidth allocation. 
The equilibrium sales prices are  1 , 1 ˆ p = 597.63,  2 , 1 ˆ p =444.01,  1 , 2 ˆ p =553.43 and 
2 , 2 ˆ p =424.63. The bandwidth allocations are  1 , 1 ˆ b =148,529,  2 , 1 ˆ b =57,539,  1 , 2 ˆ b =143,895 
and  2 , 2 ˆ b = 65,231.The sales revenues for service provider m =1 is 53,747,889.2. The 
sales revenues for service provider m = 2 is 45,847,907.6. 
The following will provide some insight into the impact of different input 
characteristics on the equilibrium sales prices and bandwidth allocations. We refer to the 
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of the change of  i h ,  m β and  1 m α   on the equilibrium values of  mi p ˆ  and  m b ˆ . In the 
following cases, only one parameter changes, while others remain unchanged. The 
computational results are described in Table 3 to Table 8. 
Table 3 shows that the values of  11 ˆ p  and  21 ˆ p  slightly decrease in the value of 
1 h , and the values of  11 ˆ b  and  21 ˆ b  slightly increase in the value of  1 h . This phenomenon 
could be explained as follows. Note from the demand function in (01) that the demand 
for commodity 1 of service provider  1 = m  increases in the value of  1 h when the sales 
price of  11 ˆ p  is lower than its rival’s sales price 21 ˆ p . In this environment, as the value of 
1 h   increases, the impact of the difference between  21 ˆ p and  11 ˆ p on demand becomes 
extensive. In case of increasing demand, service provider m = 1 may decrease its sales 
price to spur more market demand. On the other hand, the rival may decrease its sales 
price to keep its market share. Thus, the values of  11 ˆ p  and  21 ˆ p  decrease in the value 
of 1 h . In addition, since both service providers may try to sell more, they provide more 
bandwidth units for commodity 1. Thus, the values of  11 ˆ p  and  21 ˆ p  increase in the value 
of 1 h . 
Table 3 The impact of  1 h  on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
1 h   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.4  597.95   444.01   553.71  424.63  148461  57539  143809   65231  
0.5  597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  143895   65231  
0.6  597.31   444.01   553.15  424.63  148598  57539  143980   65231  
0.7  596.99   444.01   552.87  424.63  148666  57539  144065   65231  
0.8  596.67   444.01   552.59  424.63  148734  57539  144151   65231  
0.9  596.36   444.00   552.31  424.63  148802  57539  144236   65231  
 
Table 4 shows that the values of  12 ˆ p  and  22 ˆ p slightly decrease in the value of 
2 h , and the values of  12 ˆ b and  22 ˆ b slightly increase in the value of  2 h . The explanation of 
this Table can be illustrated in a similar way to that of Table 3. 
 
Table 4 The impact of  2 h  on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
2 h   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.4  597.63   444.27   553.43   424.83   148529  57508   143895   65197  
0.5  597.63   444.01   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.6  597.63   443.76   553.43   424.43   148529  57569   143895   65265  
0.7  597.62   443.50   553.43   424.23   148529  57599   143895   65298  
0.8  597.62   443.25   553.43   424.03   148529  57630   143895   65332  
0.9  597.62   442.99   553.43   423.83   148529  57660   143895   65366  
 
Table 5 shows that the value of  11 ˆ p  slightly decreases in the value of  1 β , and 
the value of  12 ˆ p   slightly increases in the value of  1 β . This phenomenon could be 
explained as follows. It is noted that the demand for commodity 1 of service provider m =   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  75 
1 decreases in the value of  1 β  when the sales price of 11 ˆ p  is higher than 12 ˆ p . As the 
value of  1 β  increases, service provider m = 1 may try to lessen the difference between 
11 ˆ p  and  12 ˆ p  to avoid the decrease in demand. Thus, service provider m = 1 decreases the 
value of  11 ˆ p , and increases the value of  12 ˆ p  as  1 β  increases. 
Table 6 shows that the value of  21 ˆ p  slightly decreases in the value of  2 β , and 
the value of  22 ˆ p  slightly increases in the value of  2 β . The explanation of this Table is 
similar to that of Table 5. 
Table 7 shows that the value of  11 ˆ b   increases in the value of  11 α . This 
phenomenon could be explained as follows. It is noted that the bandwidth required 
increases as the service level increases. Thus, service provider m = 1 increases the 
bandwidth allocation to commodity 1 when it expects to have a higher service level. 
Table 8 shows that the value of  21 ˆ b increases in the value of  21 α . The 
explanation of this Table is similar to that of Table 7. 
Table 5 The impact of  1 β  on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
1 β   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.4  597.78   443.84   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.5  597.63   444.01   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.6  597.48   444.18   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.7  597.33   444.35   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143894   65231  
0.8  597.18   444.51   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143894   65231  
0.9  597.03   444.68   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143894   65231  
 
Table 6 The impact of  2 β  on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
2 β   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.4  597.63   444.01   553.57   424.50   148530  57539   143895   65231  
0.5  597.63   444.01   553.43   424.63   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.6  597.63   444.01   553.29   424.76   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.7  597.63   444.01   553.15   424.88   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.8  597.63   444.01   553.01   425.01   148529  57539   143895   65231  
0.9  597.63   444.01   552.87   425.13   148529  57539   143895   65231  
 
Table 7 The impact of  11 α  on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
11 α   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.65  597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  141573  57539  143895   65231  
0.70   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  144919  57539  143895   65231  
0.75   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  143895   65231  
0.80   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  152550  57539  143895   65231  
0.85   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  157236  57539  143895   65231  
0.90   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  163133  57539  143895   65231  
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Table 8 The impact of  21 α on equilibrium price and bandwidth allocation 
21 α   11 ˆ p   12 ˆ p   21 ˆ p   22 ˆ p   11 ˆ b   12 ˆ b   21 ˆ b   22 ˆ b  
0.65  597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  136572   65231  
0.70   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  138804   65231  
0.75   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  141213   65231  
0.80   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  143895   65231  
0.85   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  147021   65231  
0.90   597.63   444.01   553.43  424.63  148529  57539  150955   65231  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This research discussed the problem of bandwidth allocation and pricing in an 
Internet duopoly market. The bandwidth commodities’ service level was taken into 
consideration. In order to find a solution to the problem, this research developed a 
Lagrange function to develop the optimal sales price and bandwidth allocation for both 
Internet service providers. The results were used to establish the reaction functions. 
Under certain conditions, this paper proposed closed form formulas for the market 
equilibrium price and bandwidth resource allocation. 
A numerical analysis is also provided to illustrate the impact of different input 
parameters on the equilibrium sales prices and bandwidth allocations. The results are 
summarized as follows: 
1.  For both service providers, the equilibrium sales price of a commodity 
decreases, and the bandwidth allocation of a commodity increases in the 
degree of substitutability between commodities of the two service providers 
(Tables 3 and 4). 
2.  The equilibrium sales price of commodity-1 of service provider-1 and the 
bandwidth allocation of commodity-1 of service provider-2 decrease, and 
the equilibrium sales price of commodity-2 of service provider-1 and the 
bandwidth allocation of commodity-2 of service provider-2 increase in the 
degree of substitutability between the commodities offered by service 
provider-1 (Table 5). 
3.  The equilibrium sales price of commodity-1 of service provider-2 and the 
bandwidth allocation of commodity-1 of service provider-1 decrease, and 
the equilibrium sales price of commodity-2 of service provider-2 and the 
bandwidth allocation of commodity-2 of service provider-1 increase in the 
degree of substitutability between the commodities offered by service 
provider-2 (Table 6). 
4.  The bandwidth allocation of a commodity-i for a service provider increases 
in the intercept of demand function for that commodity for that service 
provider- (Tables 7 and 8). 
Appendix 
Setting the values of  m η , 1 m y  and  2 m y  in the equation system of (15) to (20) at 
0 = m η ,  0 1 = m y  and  0 2 = m y  and letting them be equal to zero, we have   P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem  77 
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Solving the above equation system, we have  0 = mi λ  for all i and 
) ( 2
2
2 1
,
m m m
i m m i m mi i m i m i i m i m
i m
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a c a p c h p h
p
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β β
−
+ + +
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∗ + =   (34) 
m m A x = . (35) 
Since the values of  m m mi mi mi y b p , , , , η λ
∗ ∗  and  mi x  are no less than zero, 
∗
mi p  and 
∗
mi b  are optimal solutions for service provider m. 
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